The psychology of gambling: a personal overview by Griffiths, MD
Mark Griffiths explains the background to his important study of 
gambling, and responds to questions he is often asked about it by 
those studying psychology at A-level. 
This year saw the introduction of my 1994 study on the role of cogni-tive bias in slot machine gambling (Griffiths 1994) on to the OCR 
specification. Since then, I have had lots of 
correspondence from A-level psychology 
teachers (and a few students too), asking 
me a number of interesting questions about 
the study. This article presents a glori-
fied 'FAQ' that puts my study into context 
and, hopefully, answers some of the most 
commonly asked questions. 
Background inspiration 
I began a PhD on the psychology of slot 
machines back in 1987 and I spent the first 
3 or 4 months reading everything I could 
about how psychological research methods 
are used to study this relatively new area of 
research. As a PhD student, the paper that 
really inspired me was a pioneering study 
by Anderson and Brown (1984). Up until 
the mid-1980s, almost all of the experi-
mental work on the psychology of gambling 
was done in laboratory settings and the 
question of ecological validity was some-
thing that I had great concerns about. I did 
not want to study gamblers in a psychology 
laboratory, I wanted to examine them in 
actual gambling environments. 
Anderson and Brown studied the role 
of arousal in gambling and used heart 
rate measures as an indicator of arousal. 
They found that the heart rates of regular 
gamblers increased significantly by 
around 23 beats per minute (compared 
to baseline resting levels) when they were 
gambling in a casino, but when they did 
the same activity in a laboratory setting, 
there was no significant increase in heart 
rate. To me, this explained perhaps why 
previous studies on arousal during labo-
ratory gambling had failed to find signifi-
cant heart rate increases above baseline 
levels. 
Theoretical insights from 
previous research 
Anderson and Brown (1984) claimed that 
Skinnerian reinforcement theory could not 
account for the phenomenology of addic-
tive gambling (especially relapse after absti-
nence). As a result of their ecologically valid 
experimental study, Anderson and Brown 
postulated a theoretical model centred 
upon individual differences in cortical and 
autonomic arousal, in combination with 
irregular reinforcement schedules. They 
argued for a neo-Pavlovian model in which 
arousal played a central role in the addic-
tion process. According to Anderson and 
Brown, this model accounts for reinstate-
ment after abstinence and allows for the 
maintenance of the behaviour by internal 
mood/state/arousal cues in addition to 
external situation cues. 
I found this theoretical perspective too 
restrictive and believed that gambling 
addiction was a more complex process 
— the consequence of a combination of a 
person's biological/genetic predisposition, 
their psychological make-up (personality, 
attitudes, beliefs and expectations), and the 
environment in which they were brought 
up. This is what most people would now 
recognise as a bio-psychosocial perspec-
tive that runs through much of my subse-
quent writing and research. Added to this. 
I passionately believed there were other 
important factors at play, including the 
situational factors of where the activity took 
place — such as the design of the gambling 
environment — and the structural features 
of the activity itself — such as the speed 
of play — and ambient factors like lights, 
colour, noise and music. 
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Insights from cognitive bias in 
gambling 
My 1994 study on cognitive bias raised 
many interesting points and by studying 
gamblers within session, I obtained a lot 
of interesting data. I found that regular 
gamblers produced significantly more 
irrational verbalisations than non-regular 
gamblers, (The ethics committee would 
not let me use non-gamblers, as they did 
not want participants to be introduced to 
gambling via a university research study.) 
One of the most interesting observations in 
my study was that regular gamblers often 
personified the slot machine. They attrib-
uted thought processes to it and would talk 
to it as if it could actually hear them. 
Another of the more interesting observa-
tions concerned the psychology of the near 
miss (or, more accurately, the near win). 
I noticed that, when I used the thinking 
aloud method as a way of gaining direct 
cognitive access to what gamblers were 
thinking as they played a slot machine, 
regular gamblers often explained away 
their losses and changed clear losing situa-
tions into near winning ones. On a cognitive 
level, gamblers were not constantly losing, 
they were constantly nearly winning, and 
this, I argued, was both psychologically and 
physiologically rewarding for them. I also 
did a study where I measured gamblers' 
heart rates in an amusement arcade (see 
Griffiths 1993) where, like Anderson and 
Brown (1984), l found regular gamblers 
had significantly increased heart rates when 
compared to baseline resting levels. 
Study limitation? 
Anyone reading my 1994 paper wil l 
instantly spot what appears to be a major 
limitation to the study: the fact that there 
was no inter-rater reliability in the coding 
of the verbalisations that I transcribed. 
Could this be (as some have argued) the 
Achilles heel of the study? I maintain that, 
in the context of this study, having a second 
rater might have added a confounding 
variable in itself. Another rater would not 
have had the time with the data that I had 
and would not have been there at the time 
of the experiment. In short, not beingthere 
would have been a great disadvantage to 
a second coder, as they would not have 
understood the context in which various 
verbalisations were made. I transcribed 
each tape straight after each trial so that I 
could remember the context of everything 
that was said by each player. I would also 
add that this was one study that was done 
in conjunction with lots of others simul-
taneously. Details of these are provided 
below. 
Influences on other 
psychologists 
The work of Paul Delfabbro in Australia 
built on my idea of analysing gamblers 
within session. He postulated that gambling 
is maintained by winning and losing 
sequences within the operant conditioning 
paradigm (the only rewards and reinforcers 
in gambling are purely monetary). In 
response to that paper, I argued that 
Delfabbro and Winefield's contribution 
(Delfabbro and Winefield 1999) was too 
narrow in its focus, in that they had taken 
no account of the 'near miss' in relation to 
operant conditioning theory and that there 
may be other reinforcers playing a role in 
the maintenance process (such as physio-
logical rewards, psychological reward and 
social rewards). I also argued that gambling 
was bio-psychosocial behaviour and should 
therefore be explained by a bio-psychosocial 
account. 
Implications of my research 
My 1994 study showed that gamblers 
could be studied in real-life contexts and 
that useful data could be collected. It also 
showed the complexity of gambling and 
that gamblers could turn apparently objec-
tive outcomes (losing) into ones that were 
highly subjective (near winning ones). I also 
showed that this had implications for treat-
ment (see Griffiths 1993) and that perhaps 
these cognitive biases could be used by 
psychologists as a way of re-educating 
gamblers through some kind of cognitive 
correction technique. 
I should also point out that this one exper-
imental study was a small part of a much 
bigger jigsaw. What 1 mean by this is that 
my 1994 study should not be seen in isola-
tion, but read along with my simultaneous 
observational studies of arcade gamblers, 
my other experimental studies, my semi-
structured interview studies, surveys and 
my case studies. All of these studies as a 
whole were featured in my first book on 
adolescent gambling (Griffiths 1995). 
Gambling as a behavioural 
addiction 
My work into the role of cognitive bias in 
gambling and gambling addiction also led 
to my studying behavioural addictions 
more generally. Since finishing my PhD, I 
have branched out and carried out research 
into video game addiction, internet addic-
tion, sex addiction and exercise addiction 
(see Griffiths 2008 for my most recent 
overviews). Many psychologists do not view 
excessive behaviour as an addiction, but I 
consider gambling to be the breakthrough 
addiaion. I have argued that, when gambling 
is taken to excess, it can be comparable to 
other more recognised addictions like alco-
holism. If you accept that gambling can be 
a genuine addiction, there is no theoretical 
reason why other behaviours, when taken 
to excess, cannot be considered potentially 
addictive if gambling addiaion exists. 
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Despite studying behavioural addiction 
for over two decades, the number of people 
I have come across who are genuinely 
addicted to video games or the internet 
are few and far between. A key difference 
between excessive use and addiction is the 
detrimental effects (or lack of) that arise 
as a result of that behaviour. When people 
are addicted to a behaviour that becomes 
the single most important thing in their 
life, they compromise everything else in 
their life to do it. A person's job or work, 
personal relationships and hobbies are 
severely compromised. The basic difference 
between an excessive healthy enthusiasm 
and an addiction is that healthy enthusi-
asms add to life; addictions take away from 
it. This is a (non-psychological) lay view, 
but there is a lot of truth in it. 
Addicted to anything? 
Why do people get addicted to things? Can 
we get addicted to anything at all? My own 
thinking is that, as humans we would not 
do something excessively without getting 
any rewards from it. Rewards underlie all 
addictive processes and, as a result, there 
are some things that people cannot get 
addicted to. For instance, I would argue that 
someone cannot get addicted to a bi-weekly 
national lottery because there are only two 
chances a week to find the results of their 
gamble. (That does not mean the person 
cannot spend too much money though.) 
However, a slot machine is an activity 
where someone can gamble 12 times a 
minute. They may experience physiological 
rewards by getting a buzz or a high when 
they win or nearly win, they may experi-
ence psychological rewards (near misses), 
they may get social rewards (peer praise 
from when they do something well), and/ 
or they may get the financial reinforcement 
of playing. As I observed earlier, the rewards 
a person can get from gambling are spread 
across the spectrum: physiological, psycho-
logical, social and financial. 
Addictive personality? 
Another dimension to my work is insights 
into other areas of great interest, such as 
the existence of an addictive personality. Is 
there such a thing? I am firmly in the 'no' 
camp. I would argue that, if there is an 
addictive personality, psychologists would 
need to show that a set of predictive traits 
exists that is predictive of addiction and 
addiction alone. There are many person-
ality traits that have been found to relate to 
specific addictions. However, there are also 
people with these same traits who are not 
addicted. Therefore, these cannot be traits 
that are specific to addiction. However, I 
do acknowledge 'reciprocity' (that addicts 
who give up one addiction often move on 
to another). For instance, when l sit in on 
a Gamblers' Anonymous meeting, I am not 
surprised to see a large group of coffee-
drinking, chain-smoking individuals. 
The last word 
I am the first to admit that my 1994 study, 
when taken in isolation, is hardly among 
the classic studies of people like Freud, 
Watson, Skinner or Milgram. However, 
when seen as part of two decades o f 
research into gambling and other poten-
tially excessive behaviours, I would like to 
think that I have had an influence in my 
field. Only time will tell. 
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